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The research is motivated by the significant increase in multiproduct mergers in
the meat-protein processing sector, whereby the largest firms now process beef, pork, and
chicken. This thesis conducts a theoretical merger analysis, accounting for both withinand across-submarket substitution of demand related goods. The model developed is
suitable for analyzing markets in which there are identifiable consumer submarkets
within a larger market.
The results indicate two primary findings. The first finding is that Bertrand firms
have a unilateral incentive to merge. Firms involved in a given merger increase profit, as
well as those not included in the merger. Second, it is found that without sufficient
realized scope economies by the merged firm, significant anticompetitive price increases
are likely. However, as substitutability within and across submarkets tend towards each
other in magnitude, the required cost reductions for welfare neutrality increase vastly.
Additionally, guidelines for future empirical analysis are discussed.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
“Tyson Foods has a multi-protein business model. We produce about one out of
every five pounds of chicken, beef and pork in the United States along with a
broad portfolio of prepared foods…”.
Tyson Foods, Inc.’s Fiscal 2013 Fact Book (Tyson Foods, Inc., 2014)

The preceding statement published by a leading processor of beef, pork, and
chicken in the United States illustrates the meat protein industry’s belief that the relevant
consumer product market in the U.S. is that for ‘meat-protein’. The objective of
producing all meat-proteins is not new, but the realization of these multiproduct firms is
relatively new in the history of mergers and acquisitions, within the meat-protein sector.
Beef, pork, and chicken are the primary meat-protein sources for American
consumers. The United States Department of Agriculture’s Economic Research Service
(USDA-ERS) calculated that 2013 per capita availability1 of beef was 53.6 boneless
pounds, pork was 43.4 boneless pounds, and chicken was 57.7 boneless pounds (USDA1

Per capita availability is a commonly used proxy for U.S. food consumption (USDAERS, 2015b; Bentley, 2012). Bentley (2012) describes per capita availability, “Per capita
estimates are calculated by dividing the total annual supply of a food by the U.S.
population for that year. Although these estimates do not directly measure actual
quantities eaten, they provide an indication of whether Americans, on average, are
consuming more or less of various foods over time.”
1

ERS, 2015a). Figure 1.1 provides per capita availability for beef, pork, and chicken from
1963 to 2013, in boneless weight equivalents. Figure 1.1 is adapted from the work of
Bentley (2012), published in USDA’s Amber Waves Magazine, using more recent data.
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Figure 1.1

1963-2013 U.S. Per Capita Meat Availability: Beef, Pork, and Chicken

Source: USDA-ERS
In recent years, there have been several mergers within and across the three major
meat-protein industries; beef, pork, and chicken. Today, two of the three top meat
processors in the United States, Tyson Foods, Inc. and JBS USA, maintain significant
market shares in beef, poultry and pork processing (Tyson Foods, Inc., 2016; JBS, 2016).
Further, Cargill, Inc. remains a significant competitive force in the beef industry, as well
as competing in the domestic turkey industry (Cargill, 2016).
2

On October 30, 2015, JBS SA purchased Cargill’s pork division with no comment
or restriction from the Department of Justice (Reuters, 2015). Given the high percentage
of domestic consumption of beef, pork, and chicken, consumers are at risk of being
negatively impacted by increased market concentration and changing market structures in
the meat protein processing sector. One reason for these impacts is that demand for meat
protein (and by extension the derived demand to processors) is necessarily more inelastic
than that for any one sub-product. Hence, there is a potential for market power extension
and higher aggregate meat prices.
To understand the potential competitive implications of multiproduct mergers, it
is important to first understand how the Department of Justice (DOJ) has historically
evaluated the potential for economic harm from multiproduct mergers. In any merger
analysis, the definition of the relevant market is a critical step, and frequently the most
contentious when courts evaluate the competitive implications of a challenged merger.
The relevant market has two dimensions, product space and geographic location2 (DOJ,
2010). The predicted competitive implications of a merger are necessarily impacted by
how broadly or narrowly the relevant market is defined. For instance, if the relevant
market is narrowly defined, the number of competitors is necessarily reduced and
increases the market concentration and the potential for economic harm from a merger.
As a result of this, the firms proposing the merger will contend that the relevant market is
much broader and thus the merger has little potential for economic harm.

Refer to the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines (HMG) (DOJ, 2010) pages 7-14 for detailed information
regarding the market definition concepts of product space and geographic location.

2

3

Problem Statement
Little research has addressed the impacts of any multi-product merger in the meat
protein sector. In past meat processing mergers, the DOJ has restricted the definition of
the relevant product market to include only beef, pork, or chicken. For example, when the
DOJ challenged the JBS-National Beef merger, they considered only the competitive
effect in beef processing, primarily on the potential for a lower price paid to local
producers and higher beef prices to consumers, as seen in the DOJ statement of the
abandonment of the merger (DOJ, 2009). No mention was made towards the effects the
merger would have on competition, if allowed, in the other meat protein markets. A
limited number of empirical multiproduct merger analyses exist, and still even fewer
generalizable models exist for such an analysis.
Economic Research Contributions
The primary objective of this analysis is to develop a theoretical model to analyze
the competitive implications of multi-product mergers and their potential welfare
impacts. The resulting theoretical model will then be applied to the major meat
processing sectors. Further, this model generalizes to k differentiated markets, with j
unique submarkets within the larger market. The results of this work are intended to
identify conditions in which multiproduct mergers reduce competition and welfare.
Additionally, this research is intended to provide guidance for future merger simulations
and econometric analysis, first in the meat processing industry but applicable to any
differentiated product industry.

4

CHAPTER II
HISTORICAL AND LEGAL CONTEXT OF THE ISSUE
This chapter provides insight into the historical aspects of the beef, pork, and
chicken processing industries. Their past conduct and practices have shaped how these
industries are viewed today. Understanding the origins and early history of the meat
processing industries is fundamental to understanding how mergers and acquisitions will
affect the structure and conduct of those engaged in these industries. Azzam and
Anderson (1996) and Azzam (1998) also provide historical perspectives of meat
processing firms and a review of the relevant economic methods.
To understand the economic concepts involved is not sufficient for proper
analysis. The legal environment must also be considered. This chapter provides
background about some the applicable legal concepts. Understanding the legal
environment of antitrust is essential because antitrust policy issues and merger analysis
are largely legal issues that are heavily informed and guided by sound application of
economic principles.
A Short History of the Meat Processing Industries
Early History of the Beef and Pork Processing Industries
The meat sector has an intriguing history in the United States. This sector has long been
associated with competitive concerns. Francis Walker (1906) provided a thorough
background of the early meat-packing sector. Walker describes that in the early 1900’s,
5

four firms (known as the “Beef Trust”) dominated both the beef and pork processing
industry, primarily in the Midwestern United States. The Beef Trust consisted of several
dominant firms that owned the stockyards where producers sold their livestock,
processing facilities that slaughtered both beef and pork, rendering plants, and hide
plants. The Beef Trust also controlled cold storage warehousing, refrigerated rail cars,
marketing resources, and other distribution systems. This market structure brought
concerns by livestock producers, consumers, and federal regulators regarding price-fixing
and other anticompetitive actions extending to unfair treatment of workers and unsanitary
production conditions. Walker goes on to detail that on March 20, 1905 a grand jury
indictment was given for violation of the “Anti-Trust Act”. However, the meat-packers
were not prosecuted due to technicalities surrounding immunity and subpoena (Walker,
1906). Walker concludes with the following:
“In the report on the “Beef Trust” the country has shown that the popular opinions
respecting the wholesale prices of beef and the profits in the beef industry were
founded on ignorance and error. At the same time it prosecuted the packers for
alleged violation of the anti-trust law. The failure of the Government in that
undertaking was not due to any lack of zeal and energy, but to a technical legal
obstruction which no one could foresee—the opinion of one judge on a new point
of law; and if that obstruction had not appeared, the case would have been fought
to a finish on its merits.” (Walker, 1906).
Later, in 1918, President Woodrow Wilson received a report from the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) detailing the extent of continued anticompetitive actions by the
meat packing companies (FTC, 1918). The FTC found significant abuses of market
6

power; unethical, anticompetitive, and often illegal business practices; and evidence of
collusion among meat packers. The FTC recommended that the government take over
much of the railroad sectors utilized or owned by the packers (rolling stock, stockyards,
refrigerator car equipment and operations, cold storage facilities, etc.) and establish fair
marketing and storage systems(FTC, 1918). In 1920, the largest meatpackers signed a
consent decree with the DOJ agreeing to liquidate all activities except meat processing.
(Fewster, 1930). Soon after, the Packers and Stockyards Act of 1921 was enacted into
law, giving the Secretary of Agriculture regulatory authority over meat packers and live
poultry dealers (Folsom, 1980).
Early History of Poultry Processing
The poultry processing industry also has unique beginnings. According to the
National Chicken Council (National Chicken Council), it was largely a subsistence-level
activity until the 1920’s and 1930’s. Until that time, broilers were largely a byproduct of
egg production. Large broiler production operations began to gain in popularity in the
1940’s. At first, these were separated from feed mill operations and processing centers.
Quickly, the poultry industry began to show signs of vertical integration (National
Chicken Council, 2015). Currently, companies in the poultry industry are vertically
integrated; a typical poultry firm consists of hatcheries, feed mills, chicken houses, and
processing plants.
Recent Consolidation and Concentration in the Meat Processing Industries
Beginning in the 1970’s and 1980’s, consolidation and concentration have been
on the rise within the beef processing industries, while the pork industry has experienced
7

increased consolidation with moderate concentration increases, as well as a significant
shift toward vertical coordination (MacDonald et al., 2000; Azzam, 1998). Ollinger et al.
(2000) argues that there has been increasing consolidation in the poultry industry as well,
although the four firm concentration ratios are not unacceptably high. The authors argue
that the impacts of increased concentration may be limited by large increases in demand,
both domestic and abroad. Additionally, in the poultry sector, the need for quality birds
and increasing size of poultry plant facilities has led to vertical integration (Ollinger et
al., 2000).
Consolidation in these industries has given rise to concerns about market power
by some, including those in government. An example of this is the Senate Hearings on
Agricultural Market Concentration (2001), at which several notable individuals testified
concerns about concentration and market power in agriculture, including the beef packing
industry. Interestingly, a vast majority of the literature supports that increased
concentration in beef packing has occurred for reasons other than purely gaining and
exerting market power. For example, MacDonald et al. (1996), MacDonald et al. (2000),
and Ollinger et al. (2000), discuss the increasing economics of scale as a primary reason
why these industries have become more concentrated and processing plant sizes have
increased.
Four-firm concentration ratios, which measure the percentage of the market
slaughtered by the four largest firms, provide a widely used measure of market
concentration. GIPSA provides the following information: the largest four firms (in their
respective industries) accounted for 85 percent of steer and heifer slaughter, 56 percent of
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cow and bull slaughter, 64 percent of hog slaughter, and 51 percent of broiler chicken
slaughter (GIPSA, 2014).
Legal Context of Merger Analysis
Historically, mergers and acquisitions in meat processing were largely within
animal species and allowed to continue unfettered until recently (DOJ, 2009). To evaluate
horizontal mergers, The DOJ and FTC utilize the Horizontal Merger Guidelines, herein
HMG, (DOJ, 2010). The HMG detail many of the conditions and tests used to determine
if a merger is anticompetitive, increases market power unacceptably, or provides
increased opportunities for collusion or exclusion (DOJ, 2010). Of these possible
anticompetitive outcomes, increases in prices to consumers are often the greatest concern.
With the rejection of the JBS/National Beef merger in 2009, the DOJ seems to have
halted further concentration in the beef packing industry. The DOJ rejected the merger on
the basis that it would lower prices received by producers and result in higher beef prices
for consumers (DOJ, 2009).
Over the last 20 years, there have been more multiproduct mergers (i.e.,
horizontal mergers across species and related meat products). Firms engaged in one of the
three meat-protein industries have merged with firms producing a different meat-protein,
resulting in a new merged firm that is engaged in multiple major meat-protein industries.
Historically, these multiproduct mergers have not been challenged. On October 30, 2015,
JBS announced the completion of the acquisition of Cargill’s Pork assets (Reuters, 2015).
The DOJ did not challenge the merger. The DOJ may have considered the merger a
conglomerate, a type of merger very infrequently challenged by the DOJ (Kolasky,
2001). The DOJ may have looked at the merger as simply a “change of ownership” in a
9

separate market. It does appear that to date, beef, pork, and chicken products are not
included in the same relevant product market by the DOJ or FTC.
The DOJ has in the past defined “beef” products markets as separable markets, as
stated by then Deputy Assistant Attorney General Turetsky (1996):
“Past analyses of mergers in the meat packing industry suggest that steer/heifer
and cow/bull are usually distinct product markets for antitrust purposes, for
example. This is because the kind of livestock used in each of these two markets
is not readily suitable for use in the other.”
Notwithstanding the fact that Mr. Turetsky appeared to be focusing on the input side of
the meat packing industry, this statement emphasizes a clear preference for a smaller,
more narrowly defined relevant market, when dealing with meat products. This further
limits the possibility that beef, pork, and chicken might be included in the same relevant
market by the DOJ or the FTC. Given its importance to the current problem, further
discussion regarding defining the relevant product market is included in the next section.
Market Definition
The HMG detail many important aspects regarding the analysis of mergers. One
of the major focal points for nearly any merger analysis is the ‘relevant product market’.
The HMG state that a relevant market is composed of two dimensions: product market
definition and geographic market definition, utilizing the hypothetical monopolist test to
help in determinations (DOJ, 2010). Given that the relevant market plays a critical role in
the determination of competitive harm, there is much debate about the adequacy of the
HMGs role in defining a relevant product market.
10

Remer and Warren-Boulton (2014) provide a timely analysis of recent
developments of market definition use in merger analyses, including the consideration of
differentiated products when the final consumer purchases the goods. The authors
provide background about the modes of thought regarding market definition: the
traditional structural approach reliant on a market definition and the more recent use of a
direct, market effects approach using simulation. In the context of United States v. H&R
Block, Remer and Warren-Boulton conclude that:
“The H&R Block trial demonstrates that despite some desire in the antitrust
community to move beyond the two-step approach to merger analysis, market
definition is still an important part of presenting a case at trial. However, effects
analysis, such as merger simulation, can be used as part of the market definition
exercise, and therefore market definition and effects analysis can be viewed as
complementary. Indeed, merger simulation was used by the DOJ for both the
effects analysis and market definition, and the court relied on the results in
reaching the conclusion that the merger was anticompetitive.”
Additionally, Coate and Simons (2012) provide a thorough background on market
definition. Coate (2014), in regards to the H&R Block Case (among others), also finds the
following:
“Although these markets are difficult to define, the replacement of fact with
theory is problematic. As noted, additional competitive analysis in H&R Block
could have identified an empirically supportable market or isolated customer
niches at risk for price discrimination. Either approach would have allowed
standard analysis to be undertaken without the need to apply the problematic
11

diversion model to effectively assume a narrow market. Further discussion notes
that even if a narrow market is used and a monopoly or near monopoly structure
is generated, fringe expansion and entry issues must be carefully addressed prior
to concluding the merger is likely to substantially lessen competition.”
Prior to H&R Block, several others were already questioning the traditional view
of market definition. Farrell and Shapiro (2010) develop a method for considering
differentiated products industries when unilateral effects are the concern. They provide an
economics based test that would identify the likely anticompetitive effects resulting from
such a merger. Kaplow (2011) strongly favors abandoning the use of the HMG market
definition, opting in favor of methods more based in economic theory. He describes the
HMG as beginning to show some openness to the idea of alternatives to the traditional
market definition approach, although he concedes that the guidelines still tend towards
using the traditional approach3.
Coate and Simons (2012) counter these claims, stating that the traditional market
definition practices are applicable, and offer insight into whether a merger may be
anticompetitive, despite the arguments of Shapiro and Ferrell (2010) and Kaplow (2011).
Zimmer (2016) attempts to define the “new” role for market definition as a combination
of sorts, stating,
“The role of market definition is in a state of flux: instead of forming the point of
departure for determining market shares, its future will be that of describing the

Kaplow (2011) states, “Nevertheless, some controversy concerning the revised Guidelines questions their
increased openness toward more direct, economically based methods of predicting the competitive effects
of mergers. By contrast, this article suggest that, as a matter of economic logic, the Guidelines revision can
only be criticized for its timidity.”

3
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competitive landscape. The application of modern methods of directly
determining market power and competitive conditions also often requires the
identification of those undertakings that exert competitive pressure on each other.
In addition, an analysis of the degree of product differentiation and of the nature
of completion that exists on the market is often necessary. All this can in the
future be encompassed—in a broad sense of the term—by the definition of the
relevant market.”
Understanding the market definition concept serves to help understand the issues
encountered when identifying a modeling construct in this thesis, as well as framing the
problem in its appropriate antitrust context. Some of the ideologies of the noted scholars
will be adapted to the current problem, such as the status quo role of DOJ’s apparent
market definition in the meat industries. This is accomplished by formulating the
assumptions and conventions adopted in this thesis. First, it is assumed that the product
market includes the three major meat protein sources (beef, pork, and chicken) due to
these products being substitutes in retail demand (Capps, Jr., 1989) and the movement of
industry toward this multiproduct structure. Previously, it appears the DOJ considers each
meat product constitutes its own unique product market. The relevant market for meatprotein is considered the United States, thereby addressing the geographic component of
market definition. To incorporate a methodology more in line with the newly embraced
effects approach, mergers are simulated in order to see how scenarios generated by the
new market definition may affect market power in a differentiated product market.

13

CHAPTER III
LITERATURE REVIEW
The existing literature relevant to this problem pertains to four primary areas:
meat processing specific literature, horizontal merger analysis, multiproduct firm merger
analysis, and differentiated products and differentiated product merger analysis. To
begin, a select amount of literature focusing on mergers, acquisitions, and more
generally, the market structure and major demand considerations relevant to the meat
processing sector is discussed. Then, the horizontal merger analysis literature, provides
the basic framework and tools utilized in merger analysis, is highlighted.
Finally, the literature regarding modeling of mergers in differentiated products
and multiproduct settings are utilized in the development of the model herein. It is
important to note that the streams of literature surrounding multiproduct firm competition
and differentiated products analysis often work in tandem. That is, often these streams of
literature will incorporate aspects of each other in their analysis. An easy example of this,
and one discussed below is the work of Xu and Coatney (2015), who allow multiproduct
firms to produce two demand related products that are differentiated from each other.
Mergers, Market Structure, Structural Considerations in Meat Processing
Formal justification for including beef, pork, and chicken as substitutes in a meatprotein market comes from Capps, Jr. (1989). Capps Jr. also demonstrates empirically the
following using scanner data to analyze retail demand functions: “All other meat products
14

excluding beef (nonbeef) are substitutes for roast beef, ground beef, and steak. Similarly,
all other meat products excluding poultry (nonpoultry) are substitutes for chicken. All
other meat products excluding pork are substitutes for pork chops, ham, and pork loin”
(1989).
Nevo (2001) analyzed the ready-to-eat cereals industry assuming Nash-Bertrand
competition for differentiated products. Using scanner data, Nevo estimated that high
price-cost margins in the ready-to eat-cereals markets were due in part by firms
maintaining several brands and the use of effective advertising. This is an early example
of a highly concentrated, product-differentiated market in agricultural products, as well as
an example of potential government concern about market concentration. Additionally,
Nevo does two things that are relevant to this analysis. First, he obtains elasticities for
each brand. This is relevant because the model created herein is suited for empirical
estimation if the appropriate substitutability parameters can be estimated. Second, he then
utilizes them in a Nash-Bertrand pricing game between the firms to analyze if they are
reaching the collusive outcome. This thesis will also utilize Bertrand competition in the
analysis.
Additionally, Nguyen and Ollinger (2006) study the meat processing industry to
determine how productivity in both meatpacking and poultry plants are affected by
mergers and acquisitions. They find that after a merger, both meat packing and poultry
slaughter plants generally show an increase in productivity for most plant sizes compared
to those who have not merged. They note that the largest meat packing plants and small
poultry plants did not show these gains in productivity, as compared to those who had not
merged. It is important to note that the authors organized the three types of industries by
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SIC code (meat packing, prepared meat products, and poultry slaughter and processing).
Nguyen and Ollinger make another important conclusion that plant closures and/or
reselling was a distinct possibility after a merger or acquisition, which may have other
welfare consequences that were not included in the scope of their analysis. Nguyen and
Ollinger conclude that the evidence supports that mergers and acquisitions in these
industries are driven by efficiencies and synergies.
Gallet (2010) conducted a meta-analysis on price elasticities of meat. Utilizing
and accounting for various functional forms, publication types, and other potential biases
to the elasticities, several important results are discovered. Gallet finds that the price
elasticity of poultry is consistently less elastic compared to beef, lamb, and fish. Gallet’s
study also yields important information regarding the price elasticity of meat (he uses a
composite variable for meat consisting of several meats). Gallet finds that the price
elasticity of meat is susceptible to influence by three things in his meta-analysis: the
demand specification employed, the method used for estimation, and characteristics of
the journal in which the elasticity value was published. Gallet’s work highlights the
challenges of estimating consumer substitutability behavior estimates from price
elasticity estimates.
Horizontal Merger Analysis
As previously discussed, horizontal mergers are between firms engaged in the
‘same’ market level, such as two beef-packing firms in the same geographic market. Hay
and Werden (1993) provide a basic primer for analyzing horizontal mergers, pointing out
some of the major issues surrounding horizontal mergers. They provide overviews about
how Cournot, Bertrand, and dominant-firm models have been used in merger analysis.
16

They also discuss the potential for collusion, both overt and tacit, as being a concern
associated with mergers. Additionally, Hay and Werden suggest that a merger policy
should not be bound by only using calculable benefits and costs. Their discussion
identifies that though the DOJ/FTC led merger investigations are primarily based on
economics, other more qualitative aspects are incorporated into the determinations about
competitive harm.
Salant et al. (1983) discover that in a Cournot setting, horizontal mergers may
result in losses. In their analysis, only when at least eighty percent of firms collude, does
the Cournot model result in a profitable merger. Facilitating this result are the following
assumptions: identical Cournot-behaving firms, constant marginal costs, and a linear
demand system.
Joseph Farrell and Carl Shapiro (1990) study horizontal mergers with
homogenous goods using a Cournot oligopoly model. They find that horizontal mergers
typically raise prices when no synergies are available. They also indicate that in order for
a horizontal merger to lower price, significant realized economies of scale and/or learning
must take place. However, they make clear that their results hold only when goods are
homogenous and firms behave in the Cournot fashion. They leave for future research how
their results will apply if products are differentiated. They also suggest that under the
Cournot framework with homogenous goods, that it may be possible that mergers, which
reduce output, may actually improve total welfare by removing less efficient firms from
the industry.
Nocke and Whinston (2013) also apply a Cournot framework to horizontal
mergers in order to discern an optimal merger policy. The authors accomplish this by
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extending Williamson’s (1968) basic merger principle that even if some market power is
gained, the merger must create efficiencies, which must have the ultimate effect of
improving consumer welfare. Their results indicate that some larger mergers may need to
be rejected in favor of smaller mergers that have larger increases on consumer welfare.
The efficiencies’ mentioned by Nocke and Whinston would come in the form of
economies of scale in the Cournot framework.
Multiproduct Firm Competition and Mergers
Early attempts at understanding market power exertion in agricultural markets
with multiproduct markets were conducted by Schroeter and Azzam (1990) in the U.S.
beef and pork industries and Wann and Sexton (1992) in the California pear industry. Of
the extensions Wann and Sexton make to Schroeter and Azzam, perhaps most important
is that the output products were considered to be heterogeneous. These authors utilized
conjectural variations frameworks. Also, these articles address market power in their
specified industries, but do little to create a generalizable competitive model capable of
analyzing multiproduct industries from a consumer utility perspective.
Generally, the literature related to multiproduct firms has not addressed the issue
of merger analysis. Rather, the multiproduct literature discusses other aspects of merger
analysis. Typically, when multiproduct firms are considered in an analysis, a property of
their nature is being discussed.
For instance, Zhang and Zhang (1996) analyze the conditions encountered for
stability to be achieved in related multiproduct markets of various compositions,
assuming Cournot competition. The authors find that the conditions required for a stable
equilibrium in one market do not necessarily translate in the overall equilibrium for all
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considered markets. Others have considered elements of strategy regarding the behavior
of multiproduct firms, such as Symeonidis (2002), who analyzed whether or not cartels
are sustainable in a multiproduct setting.
Yet others have analyzed other issues associated with multiproduct industries,
such as De Fraja (1992) who analyzed how multiproduct structures affect optimal product
line choices. De Fraja’s results provide some interesting insight into why a meat-protein
firm might choose to merge into another meat product. Specifically, De Fraja states, “As
long as the economies of scale are non-negligible, a firm will never supply products
which are very good substitutes. However, the negative effect on the length of the
product line of the substitutability between products can be offset by high economies of
scope: a firm may supply products which are very good substitutes if the extra cost
involved by the broader product line is small.”
An early compilation of the primary concepts applicable to multiproduct
industries was achieved in Bailey and Friedlaender (1982). Their work reviews the state
of the literature and highlights the contributions from authors associated with
multiproduct firms, especially with respect to cost concepts.
Differentiated Product Analyses and Mergers
This literature review will primarily discuss product differentiation as it relates to
merger analyses. For a more thorough review of the differentiated products literature,
generally, consult Xu and Coatney (2015). Differentiated product mergers, as the name
implies, are mergers between firms in the same industry that have some form of product
differentiation. Product differentiation includes having branded products within a product
group, improved service, quality, customer service or other ways by which firms can
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differentiate their products to the consumer (Shapiro, 1995). Product differentiation
becomes pivotal to the current problem when the relevant market is considered the meat
protein market instead of simply beef, pork, and chicken in isolation; the relevant market
is now conceptually a differentiated protein market. The core change in perspective of
how to define the relevant market is to identify how the consumer views the
substitutability of these meat products.
Carl Shapiro (1995) states that products which are ‘close’ substitutes to each other
offered from two potentially merging firms are especially conducive to producing
anticompetitive price increases. He goes further to detail how to calculate diversion
ratios, a rough measure for calculating price increases, for such a merger when better
methods are not available. Closeness is of particular relevance for the meat industry
because how ‘close’ substitutes chicken, pork, and beef are to each other will be shown to
alter the impact a multiproduct merger will have on competition. Unfortunately, there is
no standard for how ‘close’ is ‘close enough’ for inclusion in the relevant product market
for merger analysis (Shapiro, 1995).
Baker and Bresnahan (1985) study mergers and/or collusion in an n-firm product
differentiated market assuming Bertrand competition. To estimate their derived
equations, they find the residual demand curves. Empirically, they find that both options
would increase market power for the dominant firm after the merger, using the U.S. beer
market as an example. This paper provides an illustrated example and background to the
issue, but does not broach the subject of how consumer welfare would be affected.
Deneckere and Davidson (1985) investigate incentives for firms to form coalitions
through mergers in a differentiated Bertrand oligopoly setting. They use Shubik’s (1980)
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demand specification as a framework. Of note, they find that gross substitutability allows
coalition members to raise price after a merger. Assumptions of their analysis include
constant marginal costs and symmetric demand. The authors also limit their analysis to
firm profits, and do not consider total welfare. Their analysis characterizes mergers in
price setting games. Deneckere and Davidson state:
“Price setting games, on the other hand, seem to capture traditional industrial
organization insights rather well. Under certain plausible conditions on the demand
system, mergers are always beneficial to existing members and become more profitable
as the size of the merger increases. The resulting industrial concentration confers large
positive externalities on other industry members, so that coalitions producing a small
number of varieties earn more than larger ones. Not surprisingly, short of antitrust policy,
the industry would concentrate almost completely towards monopoly.”
Mcelroy (1993) also investigated mergers in differentiated products industries.
Mcelroy finds that without cost savings being possible, Bertrand duopoly with linear
demand and marginal costs results in lower welfare after merger. Similarly, Mcelroy
finds that after merger and no cost savings, Cournot duopoly with constant marginal cost
results in lower welfare.
Hausman et al. (1994) evaluate differentiated product mergers in the beer industry
with specific attention given to multi-product firms. The study identifies the impacts and
importance of controlling for own-firm cannibalization, increased efficiencies on pricing
of products, use of demand elasticities for each relevant product, competition between
different market segments, and how demand for other products sold by the same firm and
competing firms may be affected by the merger and resulting price changes. Additionally,
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the authors do include basic calculations for the effects of mergers on consumer welfare.
Additionally, using empirical estimates, they calculate the required reduction in marginal
cost to offset any changes in post-merger prices. Interestingly, they find that competition
from different market segments in the beer industry is often enough to keep price
increases limited after a hypothetical merger, even when no efficiency gains are present.
Hausman et al. also show that other brands produced by the same firm (a multi-product
firm) affect the price-cost margin markup. They point out that most previous analyses
have not identified that some of the products that consumers switch to, with a price
increase, may in fact be produced by the same firm.
Werden and Froeb (1994) expand the literature by using a logit model to study the
welfare implications of mergers in a differentiated products industry under Bertrand
competition using long distance telephone carriers as an example. They find that some
mergers lessen welfare, while others have relatively little impact or slightly raise welfare,
depending on the specific attributes of the merging parties. Their study includes a welfare
analysis. However, the authors assume economies of scale and scope are not
incorporated, although they include the ability for cost advantages to be incorporated.
This analysis will preclude economies of scale from merger, but allow economies of scale
to be obtained in application. Werden and Froeb also incorporate a framework that is
easily used; requiring only market shares, prices and demand elasticity parameters.
Davis (2002) added to the literature by incorporating experimental economics to
studying the effects of mergers in product-differentiated markets. They analyze both
Bertrand and Cournot competition with different amounts of available information (basic
amounts and extra information), using the DOJ’s ALM (Antitrust Logit Model). They
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assume that all firms are identical and symmetric in a four firm oligopoly. They find that
the ALM does reasonably well at predicting large increases in price, and suggest it may
be a decent “screening tool”.
Xu and Coatney (2015) advance the differentiated products literature by easing a
prevalent restriction in differentiated products modeling that the firm can only produce
one product. By doing so, Xu and Coatney introduce the potential for a differentiated
products market composed potentially of multiproduct firms. Although this article did not
delve into merger analysis, it did serve as the cornerstone for the multiproduct,
differentiated product model created and analyzed in this thesis.
Other authors (Dixit (1979); Singh and Vives (1984); Häckner (2000); others)
also contributed to the development of the model and hence, will be discussed in the next
chapter.
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CHAPTER IV
MODEL DEVELOPMENT
In this chapter, the Bowley differentiated products utility function, Bowley
(1924), is altered to facilitate various merger scenarios (cases for comparison). Though
the Shubik-Levitan utility function is more appropriate when the analysis must consider
the addition or subtraction of products (Martin, 2002), it is assumed that for the instant
case (meat protein), no additional major categories can or will be created or eliminated as
a result of a merger. Additionally, various attributes of the meat industry are explored to
formulate which type of competition, Cournot or Bertrand, best describes competition.
Consumer Utility
The starting point for representing consumer utility in this analysis was first
presented in Häckner (2000), which was an n-firm extension of the two product Bowley
function (Bowley, 1924; Dixit, 1979; Singh and Vives, 1984). Early analyses include the
assumption that the consumer only identifies each product by the firm that produces the
product, and each firm produces only one product. Xu and Coatney (2015) relaxed this
assumption to allow for firms to produce multiple products and the consumer identifies
products by the firm producing each product. The Häckner representation, with minor
notational adjustments here, is provided in (4.1).
n

1 n
U (q, Z )    i q i    i qi2  2  q i q j   Z
2  i 1
i 1
i j
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(4.1)

In this form of utility, the  i ' s represent the representative consumer’s reservation prices
and the i ' s are independent inverse demand slope parameters. For simplicity, it is
assumed the

i ' s

are symmetric4. Though the slope of inverse demands may vary, this

analysis follows Häckner’s simplifying assumption that the i ' s are symmetric and
normalized to one. The parameter  [1, 1] represents a symmetric product
substitutability, where a value of -1 indicates perfect complements, 0 independent, and 1
perfect substitutes. Because the current analysis is applied to the meat sector, only the
region of substitutes will be considered. Finally, Z is a composite numeraire good.
The most important modification to the previous model is that utility can be
further refined to include the possibility of sub-markets within the aggregate market. A
submarket would entail any subset of products whose attributes are considered to be
‘relatively close substitutes’ within a wider sector of consumer products. For example,
the meat protein sector is comprised of several potential submarkets, such as beef, pork,
and chicken. Each submarket is in turn comprised of competing firms, each producing
aggregate composite of similar products from animal carcasses. Even if the quality
characteristics of the composite products produced by each firm are viewed as
homogenous to the consumer, some differentiation may be established by well-known
branding, such as Tyson Foods, Inc. and Pilgrim’s Pride Corporation chicken. Brand
differentiation across beef firms is much weaker at the retail level, as these firms have yet
to significantly brand their products. However, a small degree of indirect differentiation

Varying the reservation prices not only complicates merger solutions, but will also detracts from the
within- and across-submarket substitutability impacts on mergers.

4
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may be attained via product quality and service provided to the retailer, regardless of
branding.
To facilitate the analysis of submarkets, product substitutability is further broken
down into two major components: within-submarket and across-submarket. The withinsubmarket substitutability will be denoted by  , while the across-submarket
substitutability will be denoted by  . The  parameter measures how substitutable a
within-submarket firm’s product is with those products not included in the same
submarket. Because the consumer views subsets of products to be closer substitutes than
other subsets, it is logical to assume that within-submarket substitutability is greater than
the across-submarket substitutability. This relationship is formalized as 0      1 .
An analogous interpretation is that the difference between two differentiated beef
products is less than difference between beef and chicken products. The resulting general
representation of utility is provided in 4.2.
n

1 n
U (q, Z )    q i    qi2  2  q i q j  2  q h q k   Z
2  i 1
i 1
i j
hk


(4.2)

The utility identifies the i  j firm combinations within-submarket and the h  k firm
combinations across-submarkets.
In the merger analyses that follow, it is assumed the DOJ has stopped all withinsubmarket increases in concentration, leaving two firms within each submarket.
Additionally, it is assumed there are only three relevant submarkets (beef, pork, and
chicken). To begin, each firm is assumed to produce only one product within its
respective submarket, therefore, six firms in total comprise sector competition. The
resulting set of pairwise within-submarket product combinations identified by firm are
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{1,2}, {3,4}, and {5,6}. The resulting pairwise across-submarket combinations identified
by firm are {1,3}, {1,4}, {1,5}, {1,6}, {2,3}, {2,4}, {2,5}, {2,6}, {3,5}, {3,6}, {4,5}, and
{4,6}. The firm/product specific utility function is provided in (4.3).
 6 2

qi  2  q1q2  q3q4  q5 q6 



6
1  i 1
Z
U    qi 


q
q

q
q

q
q

q
q

q
q

q
q


2
i 1
1 3
1 4
1 5
1 6
2 3
2 4
 2 
 
  q2 q5  q2 q6  q3q5  q3q6  q4 q5  q4 q6  


(4.3)

6

Consumers maximize utility subject to a budget constraint

 p q  Z  I , where I
i 1

i i

is income and the price for the composite good is normalized to one. The resulting system
of firm/product specific linear inverse demands are provided in (4.4).
 p1    q1   q2    q3  q4  q5  q6 

. . .
 p    q  q   q  q  q  q
 1 2 3 4
6
5
 6

(4.4)

The corresponding system of linear demands is in (4.5).


 1  2  2   2   1  2  4 2    p1   4 2    2   2  p2      ( p3  p4  p5  p6 )
q1 
 2    1  11  4   


. . .

2
2
2
2
q   1  2  2     1  2  4    p6   4    2    p5      ( p1  p2  p3  p4 )
 6
 2    1  11  4   


(4.5)

It is now possible to formulate own- and cross-price elasticities as a function of
the parameters, primarily  ,  and

 . Comparative statics of these elasticities for the

premerger case will yield insight into their properties.
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qi , i  [1...6] it is necessary to take the partial

To find the own price elasticity for
derivative of

qi

with respect to

pi . The representative and symmetric derivative is

provided in 4.6

qi
1  2  4 2  

pi  1  2    1   1  4   

(4.6)

The resulting own price elasticity for firm one is provided in 4.7 as an example.
Ed ,q1 

q1
p1
*
p1 q1 ( p1 ,..., p6 )

 1  2  4    p
   2    p   1     1  2       p
2



 1  2  4

2

   p1   4

2

2

1

2

3

 p4  p5  p6  

0

(4.7)
From the own-price elasticity in 4.7, several comparative statics are now
conducted. However, to facilitate this process and maintain the premerger prices, several
restrictions are required. These assumptions include that all prices are positive, all prices
are equal to each other, and

  pi . It is found that both

Ed ,q1


 0 and

Ed ,q1


 0,

indicating that increasing substitutability within or across submarkets would cause the
own price elasticity to become more relatively elastic. Conversely,

Ed ,q1


 0 which

shows that increasing the representative consumer’s maximum willingness to pay would
force the own price elasticity to become more inelastic.
Additionally, cross-price elasticities were calculated for

q1

with respect to

p1 .

This will allow for evaluation of the cross-price effects of the other good in the same
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submarket. Again, given symmetric demand only the derivative q1 with respect to

p2

will be taken, and is provided in 4.8.

q1
4 2    2   2

p2  1  2    1   1  4   

(4.8)

The cross price elasticity is provided in 4.9.

Ed ,q1, p 2 


q1
p2
*

p2 q1 ( p1 ,..., p6 )

 1  2  4

2

 4

2

   2   2  p2

   p1   4 2    2   2  p2   1     1  2       p3  p4  p5  p6  

0

(4.9)
As was the case for the comparative statics of own price elasticity

Ed ,q1, p 2


Ed ,q1, p 2


 0 and

 0 , indicating that increasing substitutability within or across submarkets

positively increases the cross-price elasticity. This is to be expected because increasing
the substitutability between the two goods, increases the amount of the good switched
when good 1 has a price increase. Alternatively,

Ed ,q1, p 2


 0 , which indicates that if the

representative consumer’s maximum willingness to pay were to increase, then an increase
in the price of good 1 would cause a small shift towards good 2. This follows intuitively
because if the consumer were to value the good more (higher maximum willingness to
pay) then, a marginal price change would cause a much smaller price change than if they
did not value the good as much.
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Firm Competition
Shapiro (1989) stated, “The choice between a pricing game and a quantity game
cannot be made on a priori grounds. Rather, one must fashion theory in a particular
industry to reflect the technology of production and exchange in that industry.”
Following this logic, competition in the meat processing sector, be it Cournot or
Bertrand, is identified in relation to supply chain characteristics within each meat
industry. Specifically, the structure of the supply chain directly impacts the level of
control the processing firm has over the quantity produced.
To begin, the biological production cycles for the three live animal inputs varies
significantly and there are various levels of production sectors from conception to
slaughter. According to Ward (1997), the biological production cycle for beef cattle is
twenty-four months. The major production sectors before processing are cow-calf
producers, stocker operators, and feeders. It is only the cow-calf producers that set
quantity in the market. In stark contrast, the biological broiler chicken production cycle
takes about five months, and the production system is fully vertically integrated, hence
quantity produced is directly controlled by the processor in two major stages: hatching
and growing. Pork production exists between these two extremes. The biological
production cycle for pork is twelve months and the supply chain is moderately vertically
coordinated. The supply chain generally is comprised of farrowing and finishing firms
(Ward, 1997).
These production cycle and supply chain structures impact the processor’s ability
to control quantity in response to changing prices. It appears that there is no clear
identification which best describes competition among all competitors in the meat
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processing industry. However, due to the long production cycle in one (beef) and the
breeding of two (beef and pork) are largely controlled by upstream suppliers (for the
exception of chicken), it is assumed the processors are more prone to Bertrand
competition. This is in stark contrast to the prevalent assumption of Cournot competition
in the Agricultural Economics literature, even for beef processors (Schroeter and Azzam,
1990; Crespi et al., 2010, and others). It is of note that it is possible to allow some firms
to be Cournot competitors and others to be Bertrand competitors5 (Tremblay and
Tremblay, 2011).
Given the assumption of competition and

qi is the firm/product specific demand,

firms maximize the profit objective function provided in (4.10).

 i  ( pi  ci )qi  Fi

(4.10)
*

Firms maximize the objective function by choosing their optimal output price pi , subject
to the reaction of their within- and across submarket rivals. It is also assumed that firms
have reached economies of scale within each submarket from previous mergers and thus
experience constant marginal costs,
costs are denoted by

Fi

ci , within the relevant region of production. Fixed

and are assumed to equal zero. To ensure a solution exists, 

 ci

. This assumption is made such that the marginal cost of producing a product is not
greater than the maximum the representative consumer would be willing to pay. Finally,

i

was previously assumed to be symmetric, and appears to be inconsistent with market

price differentials across meat submarkets at relatively equal quantity demanded

5

However, this approach was not pursued for the sake of tractability.
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(Bentley, 2012). However, to maintain ‘relatively’ symmetric profitability across meat
processors, it follows that

ci

can also be assumed to be symmetric.
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CHAPTER V
MERGER CASE ANALYSIS
This chapter uses the theoretical consumer model developed in Chapter IV to
model several merger cases and the resulting impacts, in terms of prices, quantities,
profit, and welfare, each merger would have. This chapter is organized in two parts. The
first part provides a description of each of the merger cases being analyzed, including
each Case’s relevance to the analysis. The second part of this chapter reports, discusses,
and compares the impacts of each merger case.
Merger Case Descriptions
Case I: Premerger
Case I, the premerger case consists of three submarkets with two firms in each of the
submarkets. This will serve as the baseline, from which later calculations can be
compared. In the context of this research, each submarket would represent a different
meat protein submarket (i.e., beef, pork, or chicken) as a part of the larger meat-protein
market. A visual representation of the market depicted in Case I is presented in Figure
5.1.
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Figure 5.1

Case I: 3 Submarkets, 2 Firms per Submarket

This figure demonstrates the relationships between different actors in Case I. Also
provided in the figure are the relevant substitutability relationships.
Case II: A Single Multiproduct Firm across all Three Submarkets
Case II depicts a scenario in which one firm has merged across each submarket,
much like we see in these markets today, resulting in a multiproduct firm with contact in
all three submarkets. It seems unlikely that the DOJ would challenge such a merger
because it would be viewed a change of ownership in a new market. This stems from the
traditional view that the each meat product makes up its own unique market. However, a
cornerstone of this analysis is entertaining the notion of an alternative market definition
encompassing the major meats in the meat-protein sector.
Now, each submarket consists of an entity operated by the multiproduct firm and
a fringe firm, where the fringe firm is specific to that submarket. These relationships are
provided in Figure 5.2. Mathematically, Case II is different from Case I in that the
multiproduct firm is no longer maximizing profit for each product individually. Instead,
they are now maximizing the joint profit for all products they produce.
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Figure 5.2

Across-submarket Merger by One Firm

Case III: Two Multiproduct Firms across all Three Submarkets
Case III depicts the next logical step from Case II. If one firm is allowed to merge
across products unchallenged due to being a change of ownership, then it would be
possible for the three fringe firms to merge together and create a matching multiproduct
firm. Figure 5.3 depicts the new industry structure. In Case III, both multiproduct firms
are now maximizing joint profits across all their products.
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Figure 5.3

Meat-Protein Industry: Two Conglomerates

Note: As before, substitutability between the beef, pork and chicken submarkets is the
same (  ) and within-product substitutability is the same (  ).
Case IV: Monopolization of One Submarket
Case IV provides a “what-if” analysis, given the DOJ interpretation of market
definition. DOJ would surely challenge any submarket attempting to merge to monopoly.
However, this likely constraint is removed in order to compare the impacts of a change in
the relevant market. In our analysis, the beef submarket merges to. In order to avoid
functional form issues with the Bowley function and to maintain the slight differentiation
between the two fresh beef products, the monopolized beef industry would still consist of
two products. This coincides with real world conditions because often a merged firm
maintains the brand they have purchased, so that they may not risk losing those
consumers who display brand loyalty to the acquired brand. A visual of Case IV is
provided in Figure 5.4.
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Figure 5.4

Monopolization of the Beef Submarket

Note that beef submarket has merged to monopoly while the pork and chicken
submarkets each consist of two individual firms.
Case IV allows for insight into whether a merger to monopoly (Case IV),
multiproduct firm (Case II), or conglomerates (Case III) would be more or less
competitive under the market definition given for this analysis. In Case IV, the beef
submarket monopolist is maximizing joint profits across his two beef products. The other
firms are maximizing their profits.
Case V: Hypothetical Meat-Protein Monopolist
Case V depicts a scenario in which a monopolist controls the entire meat-protein
market. This is visualized in Figure 5.5.
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Figure 5.5

Meat-Protein Monopolist

*The meat-protein monopolist controls the entire industry, but maintains separate lines
for each product (a necessity with the Bowley function).
Case V is extremely unrealistic and highly unlikely to be allowed by the DOJ.
However, this case highlights several important outcomes. Note that the monopolist is
still allowed to carry all 6 products, such that he can still capitalize on brand loyalty6.
Results
The mergers in each case were analyzed using standard profit maximization
techniques utilizing Wolfram Mathematica Version 10.2 software, in order to obtain
equilibrium price, quantity, profit, and welfare results. These results are discussed below.
For further understanding of the methods used to obtain results, see Appendix A, which
details the calculations utilized in the Bowley differentiated product duopoly model and
how the mathematical system functions. Appendix B provides supplementary information
about the price results and comparisons, while Appendix C provides further details for
quantity comparisons. Additionally, Appendix D lists the resulting price, quantity, and
profit expressions, sorted by each case. Finally, Appendix E details the symmetry
relationships established in the various cases. This is included as an aid to the reader.
Additionally, this is required because it satisfies previously mentioned requirements of the Bowley
functional form.

6
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Results indicate that the DOJ’s stance toward mergers in the meat-protein sector
is understandable; mergers with submarket do carry significant potential lessening of
competition. Interestingly, results also show that mergers across submarkets, absent
sufficient cost reductions, are also capable of anticompetitive harm. Further, this becomes
stronger when within submarket substitutability and across submarket substitutability are
sufficiently close.
Equilibrium Prices
Table B.1 in Appendix B and its corresponding figures, show all comparisons
among prices. Compared to the premerger case (Case I), all prices were higher after
merger. Case V, the meat-protein monopolist case, results in higher prices than in any
other case presented. The multiproduct firm in Case II charges higher prices than any
fringe firm in Case II. Additionally, the price charged by either conglomerate firm in
Case III is higher than the price charged by both the multiproduct firm and fringe firm in
Case II. The price charged by the submarket monopolist in Case IV is greater than the
price charged by any of the fringe firms in Case IV.
An interesting result was found when comparing the prices charged by firms in
either Case II or Case III versus the prices charged by firms in Case IV. Clear results
were not immediate. Depending on the levels of substitutability within and across
submarkets, different results arose. This, itself, is a valuable discovery in that in a
differentiated products industry, how consumers view the relationships between
substitute goods affects the prices firms can charge, and subsequently the quantities
produced, firm profits, and welfare. In order to simplify the depiction of the results,
restrictions are placed on the substitutability parameters, 0    .75    1. However
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arbitrary the break point, the qualitative nature of the results are not affected in any
meaningful way. These parameters are likely justifiable for any industry It is logical that
consumers view products within a submarket as more highly substitutable than across
submarkets. For example, two firm’s chicken products (boneless breasts, for example) are
likely to be highly substitutable, with only branding or some relatively small magnitude
quality differentiation. However, consumers likely view beef products as less
substitutable for chicken products.
Appendix B provides further details about the equilibrium price comparisons
between Case IV and Case II and Case III. It is important to note that the Case IV yields
higher prices so long as the two substitutability parameters are “sufficiently different”
from each other and in agreement with the other restrictions made for many of the cases.
However, this should not be misconstrued into an absolute meaning regarding Case IV.
Refer to Appendix B for specific analysis. The equilibrium prices show that
substitutability greatly affects the price a firm is willing to charge for their product or
products. Given optimal pricing for each case, equilibrium quantities, profits, and welfare
can now be provided.
Equilibrium Quantities
Comparisons were made among the resulting quantities produced by each firm for
each resulting case. Some general findings are presented below, while the complete series
of comparisons is available in Appendix C and its associated tables and figures. The first
finding is that every merger case results in lower output quantities as compared to the
premerger case (Case I). Additionally, Case V results in the lowest quantities produced,
as compared to any of the other cases.
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In Case II (the case with a single multiproduct firm and fringe competitors), the
multiproduct firm produces less of any given product than does the fringe. However,
comparing the quantities produced in Case II and Case III some intriguing results occur.
For good 1, the conglomerate firm (Case III, product 1) produces more than the single
multiproduct firm (Case II, product 1). However, the fringe firm in Case II (Case II,
product 2) produces more than the corresponding product in Case III.
Several interesting outcomes are observed regarding Case IV, the submarket
monopolist case. To start, any fringe firm in Case IV produces a larger quantity of
product than the submarket monopolist in Case IV. The submarket monopolist firm
producing product 2 (Case IV), produces less than the fringe firm in Case II, product 2.
However, any fringe firm in Case IV produces more per product than the multiproduct
firm in Case II, or a product of one of the conglomerate firms in Case III.
Relative to product substitutability, the first comparison is of quantity produced of
product 1 for a submarket monopolist (Case IV) against one of the products (product 1)
produced by a multiproduct firm in Case II. For product 1, the submarket monopolist
only produces a higher quantity when the two substitutability parameters are sufficiently
close to one another. As such, the submarket monopolist (Case IV) produces less of
product 1 than does a firm in the conglomerate case (Case III). Finally, any fringe firm in
Case IV will produce less than any fringe firm in Case II unless the substitutability
parameters are sufficiently close.
The equilibrium quantity results, much like the equilibrium price results, indicate
that within submarket and across submarket substitutability play a prominent role in the
actual quantity produced.
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Equilibrium Profits
Next, the profits earned by the firms in the various merger cases will be analyzed
and compared. These findings will highlight the incentives firms may have to merge.
Table 5.1 below provides the relevant profit comparisons.
Table 5.1
Comparison

Profit Comparisons by Case (I-V) and Firm (Or Firm Combination in after
A Merger)

 II ,135   I ,1

Explanation/Notes (if Necessary)

 II ,2   I ,2

 III ,135   I ,1

 IV ,12   I ,1
 IV ,3   I ,3

V   I ,1

 II ,135   II ,2
 II ,135   III ,135


See Figure 5.6.

 II ,135   IV ,12


 II ,135   IV ,3
 II ,135  V

 II ,2   III ,135
 II ,2   IV ,12

 II ,2   IV ,3


See Figure 5.7.

 II ,2  V
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Table 5.1 (Continued)

 III ,135   IV ,12


See Figure 5.8.

 III ,135   IV ,3

 III ,135  V
 IV ,12  V

 IV ,3  V

 IV ,3   IV ,12
Unless otherwise noted, these comparisons hold for the conditions 0    1 ,     1 ,
  0 , and 0  c   . Notation for this consists of the item being described in regular
script. Subscripts directly below allow for each case to be identified (I, II, III, IV, V), as
well as the firm/product to be identified (1..6). Refer back to Tables (5.1-5.5) for
additional information, if needed. In the context of the problem, firms 1 and 2 produce
beef, firms 3 and 4 produce pork, and firms 5 and 6 produce chicken.
Given the equilibrium price and quantities, the profits earned by both the merged
parties and remaining fringe firms were higher than any firm in the premerger case. This
illustrates that even if a given firm is not involved in a merger, they still benefit from
higher profits. The fact that profits for the multiproduct firm (Case II; products 1, 3, and
5) are greater than the premerger profits shows a unilateral incentive for firms to become
multiproduct firms.
The multiproduct firm (Case II) achieves higher profits than any fringe firm in
Case II. Additionally, profits for both conglomerate firms (Case III) were unilaterally
greater than the profits earned by the multiproduct firm in Case II or any fringe firm in
Case II. Given that one firm has merged to become a multiproduct firm (as in Case II), it
is in the remaining fringe firms’ self-interest to achieve higher profits by forming the

43

matching multiproduct firm, resulting in Case III. This again verifies the unilateral
incentive to merge.
Comparisons between Case II and Case IV as well as between Case III and Case
IV also highlight some highly significant findings, especially as they relate to the DOJ’s
apparent position regarding product conglomerate mergers. First, the multiproduct firm in
Case II earns higher profits than any single fringe firm in Case IV. Also, the submarket
monopolist in Case IV earns higher profits than any fringe firm in Case II. Similar to this,
a conglomerate firm in Case III earns higher profits than any single fringe firm in Case
IV. Additionally, the submarket monopolist in Case IV obtains higher profits than any
fringe firm in the same case. Profits for the hypothetical meat-protein monopolist were
higher than profits earned by a single firm in any other case. This is to be expected, and is
a somewhat rudimentary check to ensure the model has reliable predictive properties.
A pivotal comparison for analysis into whether or not a multiproduct frim is more
damaging than a submarket monopolist can now be considered. This comes from
comparing the multiproduct firm in Case II against the submarket monopolist in Case IV.
Figure 5.6 provides this comparison.

44

Figure 5.6

Relative Profit Comparison: π135 (Case II) vs. π12 (Case IV)

Note: To aid in graphing, α=1.5 and c=1. Areas in orange, which are above the horizontal
plane at 0, highlight the areas in which the multiproduct firm (Case II) obtains a higher
profit than a submarket monopolist (Case IV). This occurs under the restriction
0    .75    1.
From Figure 5.6 it can be seen that there are significant regions of product
substitutability in which the submarket monopolist will have higher profits than the
multiproduct firm. Also note that for some values of the substitutability parameters, those
values tending close to perfect substitutes within submarket and/or independent across
submarkets, there exists no possibility for the multiproduct firm from Case II to earn
higher profits than the submarket monopolist of Case IV.
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Figure 5.7

Relative Profit Comparison: π2 (Case II) vs. π3 (Case IV)

Note: To aid in graphing, α=1.5 and c=1. Areas in orange, which are above the horizontal
plane at 0, highlight the areas in which the multiproduct fringe firm (Case II) obtains a
higher profit than a fringe firm in Case IV. This occurs under the restriction
0    .75    1.
Similar to Figure 5.7, Figure 5.6 provides the areas in which a fringe firm in Case
II will have a higher profit than a corresponding fringe firm in Case IV. Like before, only
when the substitutability parameters are sufficiently close, will the fringe firm in Case II
have a higher profit than a fringe firm in Case IV. The final profit comparison, provided
in Figure 5.8, compares the profits of the submarket monopolist in Case IV against a
conglomerate firm in Case III.
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Figure 5.8

Relative Profit Comparison: π135 (Case III) vs. π12 (Case IV)

Note: To aid in graphing, α=1.5 and c=1. Areas in orange, which are above the horizontal
plane at 0, highlight the areas in which the conglomerate firm (Case III) earns a higher
profit than a submarket monopolist (Case IV). This occurs under the restriction
0    .75    1.
The comparison between the conglomerate firm’s profit in Case III and the
submarket monopolist’s profits in Case IV, are similar to that of the Case II multiproduct
firm and submarket monopolist in Case IV. There are still regions of substitutability
where the Case IV submarket monopolist is able to earn higher profits than even a two
multiproduct firm of Case III. In its totality, these results indicate that there exists
significant credence to the DOJ’s views towards not allowing merger to monopoly in any
submarket.
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Welfare Consequences
Perhaps the most important economic concept for merger analysis is the
calculation of welfare (including consumer, producer and total welfare). This allows for
the net effects of the merger to be calculated in totality. Practically, this yields a
justifiable set of results, in terms of pure economics. However, this misses much in the
larger realm of antitrust analysis. Kirkwood and Lande (2008) show that antitrust laws
intended, and courts have consistently upheld, that the purpose of these laws is consumer
protection, not economic efficiency. Kirkwood and Lande also provide information on
the ‘traditional’ view focused on the efficiency argument, but make clear that the courts
have not embraced this view. The courts have opted for the consumer protection
argument. Further, Zerbe (2015) finds the following, “This nevertheless means that in at
least 1,478 cases, or ninety-eight percent of all federal antitrust cases, consumer
protection was the overriding concern.”
This thesis will not address the merits of these arguments. Rather, results
reflecting both modes of thought will be presented. Total welfare results will be
presented, noting both producer and consumer surplus. This will allow for comparisons
of total welfare, consumer surplus, and producer surplus. This thesis is merely showing
the welfare implications in the traditional economic sense, whilst carefully noting the
broader, legal perspective of antitrust analysis.
To calculate consumer and producer surplus, the methods of Chung et al. (2013)
are utilized. They performed similar welfare calculations based on a modification of the
Bowley functional form, from which their calculations may be modified to fit the
specification provided in this paper. Producer surplus (PS) is simply the total industry
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profits (for a given case). Because the underlying utility function is that of the
representative consumer, consumer surplus (CS) can be calculated in the manner
provided in expression 5.4.
6

CS  U   pi qi
i 1

(5.1)

Total surplus, or total welfare, is simply TS  CS  PS .
Consumer Surplus
Table 5.2 provides the relevant consumer surplus comparisons.
Table 5.2

Consumer Surplus Comparisons for Merger Cases

Comparison

CSII  CSI

Notes/Explanation (if Necessary)

CSIII  CSI
CSIV  CSI

CSV  CSI

CSIII  CSII


See Figure 5.9.

CS IV  CS II


CSV  CSII


See Figure 5.10.

CS IV  CS III


CSV  CSIII
CSV  CSIV

Unless otherwise noted, these comparisons hold for the conditions 0    1 ,     1 ,
  0 , and 0  c   . See related graphs for additional information.
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From Table 5.2 it is seen that consumer surplus in every case is less than Case I.
Additionally, Case V unambiguously results in the lowest consumer welfare compared to
any other case. Consumer surplus in the two multiproduct firm case (Case III) is lower
than in the multiproduct case (Case II). Figure 5.9 visualizes the comparison. Given the
restrictions, it is seen that as long as the substitutability parameters are sufficiently
different from each other, that consumer welfare is greater in Case II than in Case IV.

Figure 5.9

Relative Consumer Surplus Comparison: Case IV vs. Case II

Note: To aid in graphing, α=1.5, c=1, and Z=1. Areas in orange, which are above the
horizontal plane at 0, visualize the areas in which consumer surplus is greater for Case IV
than Case II. Notice that given the additional restrictions, 0    .75    1, which are
graphed here, it can be seen that this only occurs when the substitutability parameters are
sufficiently close.
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As provided in Figure 5.10, Case IV compared against Case III results in very
similar findings. When the substitutability parameters are sufficiently close, consumer
surplus is greater in Case IV. Otherwise, when the substitutability parameters are
sufficiently different, consumer surplus is greater in Case III than in Case IV.

Figure 5.10

Relative Consumer Surplus Comparison: Case IV vs. Case III

Note: To aid in graphing, α=1.5, c=1, and Z=1. Areas in orange, which are above the
horizontal plane at 0, visualize the areas in which consumer surplus is greater for Case IV
than Case II. Notice that given the additional restrictions, 0    .75    1, which are
graphed here, it can be seen that this only occurs when the substitutability parameters are
sufficiently close
Producer Surplus
The producer surplus comparisons made here result in nearly the exact opposite
outcomes as the consumer surplus comparisons. When compared to the premerger case
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(Case I), every subsequent case results in higher producer surplus. Along with this, the
meat-protein monopolist case (Case V) results in higher producer surplus than any other
case. Additionally, producer surplus is higher in the two multiproduct firm case (Case III)
than in the single multiproduct firm case (Case II). These comparisons are provided in
Table 5.3.
Table 5.3

Producer Surplus Comparisons for the Merger Cases

Comparison

PSII  PSI

Notes/Explanation (if Necessary)

PSIII  PSI

PSIV  PSI
PSV  PSI
PSIII  PSII


See Figure 5.11.

PS IV  PS II


PSV  PSII


See Figure 5.12.

PS IV  PS III


PSV  PSIII
PSV  PSIV

Unless otherwise noted, these comparisons hold for the conditions 0    1 ,     1 ,
  0 , and 0  c   . Notation for this consists of the item being described in regular
script. Subscripts directly below allow for each case to be identified (I, II, III, IV, V).
Refer back to Tables (5.1-5.5) for additional information.
Comparison between the submarket monopolist case (Case IV) and the single
multiproduct firm (Case II) is provided in Figure 5.11. Given the restrictions, producer
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surplus in Case IV is always greater than that in Case II so long as the substitutability
parameters are sufficiently different from one another.

Figure 5.11

Relative Producer Surplus Comparison: Case IV vs. Case II

Note: To aid in graphing, α=1.5, c=1, and Z=1. Areas in orange, which are above the
horizontal plane at 0, visualize the areas in which producer surplus is greater for Case IV
than Case II. Notice that given the additional restrictions 0    .75    1, which are
graphed here, it can be seen that this only occurs when the substitutability parameters are
sufficiently different.
Producer surplus in Case IV is also compared to the producer surplus in Case III,
as provided in Figure 5.12. Given the restrictions, 0    .75    1, producer surplus in
Case IV is greater than Case II in all cases where the substitutability parameters are
sufficiently different.
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Figure 5.12

Relative Producer Surplus Comparison: Case IV vs. Case III

Note: To aid in graphing, α=1.5, c=1, and Z=1. Areas in orange, which are above the
horizontal plane at 0, visualize the areas in which producer surplus is greater for Case IV
than Case III. Notice that given the additional restrictions 0    .75    1, which are
graphed here, it can be seen that this occurs when the substitutability parameters are
sufficiently different.
Total Welfare
Total welfare comparisons were also conducted as a part of this section. Generally
speaking, the results for total welfare did not qualitatively differ from the results for
consumer surplus. Out of the ten possible comparisons, only Case III compared to Case II
was somewhat different. In the consumer surplus case, Case III was unambiguously
lower than Case II. However, in terms of total welfare, Case III compared to Case II
required further restrictions to reasonably classify. This, along with other total welfare
comparisons will be discussed below. Table 5.4 provides the total welfare comparisons.
54

Table 5.4

Total Welfare Comparisons for the Merger Cases

Comparison

TSII  TSI

Notes/Explanation (if Necessary)

TSIII  TSI

TSIV  TSI
TSV  TSI

TS III  TS II



See Figure 5.13 and 5.14.

See Figure 5.15.

TS IV  TS II


TSV  TSII


See Figure 5.16.

TS IV  TS III


TSV  TSIII
TSV  TSIV

Unless otherwise noted, these comparisons hold for the conditions 0    1 ,     1 ,
  0 , and 0  c   . Notation for this consists of the item being described in regular
script. Subscripts directly below allow for each case to be identified (I, II, III, IV, V).
Refer back to Tables (5.1-5.5) for additional information.
Total welfare in the premerger case was greater than that of any other case
presented. Additionally, total welfare was unambiguously lower in Case V than any other
case. Again, the further restrictions on the two substitutability parameters was required
for further analysis. The total welfare comparison that is slightly different from its related
case in consumer surplus was the comparison between total welfare in Case II and Case
III. Figure 5.13, provides this comparison.
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Figure 5.13

View 1:Relative Total Surplus Comparison: Case II vs. Case III

Note: To aid in graphing, α=1.5, c=1, and Z=1. Areas in orange, which are above the
horizontal plane at 0, visualize the areas in which total surplus is greater for Case II than
Case III. Notice that given the additional restrictions 0    .75    1, which are
graphed here, it can be seen that this occurs generally, albeit with some exceptions.
Strictly speaking, this result does not differ from its consumer surplus iteration.
Generally, total surplus in Case II is greater than that of Case III. However, due to some
strange nonlinearities near the limit of the model where  tends towards 0 and  near 1,
total surplus can be greater for Case III than Case II. Figure 5.14 provides the extreme
example of this. More research should be done to understand this peculiarity.
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Figure 5.14

View 2:Relative Total Surplus Comparison: Case II vs. Case III

Note: To aid in graphing, α=1.5, c=1, and Z=1. Areas in orange, which are above the
horizontal plane at 0, visualize the areas in which total surplus is greater for Case II than
Case III.
Two other comparisons warrant further discussion. The first of Case IV and Case
II. This is presented in Figure 5.15. With the added restrictions, total welfare in Case IV
is only greater than total welfare in Case II when the substitutability parameters are
sufficiently close.
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Figure 5.15

Relative Total Surplus Comparison: Case IV vs. Case II

Note: To aid in graphing, α=1.5, c=1, and Z=1. Areas in orange, which are above the
horizontal plane at 0, visualize the areas in which total surplus is greater for Case IV than
Case II. Notice that given the additional restrictions, 0    .75    1, which are
graphed here, Case IV is only greater than Case II when the substitutability parameters
are sufficiently close.
The final total welfare comparison is that of total welfare for the submarket
monopolist case (Case IV) compared against the two multiproduct firms case (Case III).
This comparison is provided in Figure 5.16. With the restrictions 0    .75    1, it can
be seen that total surplus for the two multiproduct firm case (Case III) is greater than the
total surplus for the submarket monopolist case (Case IV) for all areas except those areas
in which the substitutability parameters are sufficiently close to one another.
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Figure 5.16

Relative Total Surplus Comparison: Case IV vs. Case III

Note: To aid in graphing, α=1.5, c=1, and Z=1. Areas in orange, which are above the
horizontal plane at 0, visualize the areas in which total surplus is greater for Case IV than
Case II. Notice that given the additional restrictions, 0    .75    1, which are
graphed here, Case IV is only greater than Case II when the substitutability parameters
are sufficiently close.
Generally speaking, it did not make a significant difference as to whether a
consumer surplus standard or total welfare standard was utilized as the criterion for harm.
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CHAPTER VI
ECONOMIES OF SCOPE
Case II demonstrated that when a firm merges across all three submarkets, market
power increased resulting in harm to both consumers and economic efficiency. These
results assumed no economies of scale or scope were gained as a result of the merger.
Economies of scope, if present, are a possible source of market power neutralization.
Case I and Case II will now be revisited with a focus on incorporating economies of
scope into the analysis. This allows for derivation of the required cost reductions to keep
prices, and by default welfare, at the premerger levels.
In their landmark text, “Contestable Markets and the Theory of Industry
Structure”, Baumol, Panzar, and Willig (1982) explain economies of scope as,
“…there is also the possibility that cost savings may result from simultaneous
production of several different outputs in a single enterprise, as contrasted with
their production in isolation, each by its own specialized firm. That is, there may
exist economies resulting from the scope of the firm’s operations.”
Economies of scope apply when the merged firm produces a product in three submarkets.
To incorporate economies of scope, the constant cost parameter, c, will first be redefined
for each of the i pre-merger firms in expression 6.1.

ci  ki  mi
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(6.1)

In expression 6.1, the parameter k represents product specific costs. These costs
are unique to the product being produced and cannot be reduced or increased due to
merger. Reductions in production specific costs is not expected due the heterogeneous
production processes for each animal species. For example, if a beef firm merged with a
chicken firm, the processing equipment in either plant would not substitute into the other
production process.7 The parameter m represents the general business costs common to
all products produced, for example “management” costs. Management cost captures
corporate level costs primarily in three areas: management, marketing, and distribution.
In this model, scope economies (diseconomies) can come from reductions (increases) in
management cost.
For instance, the reduction in salary and benefits expenses from only having one
CEO and Board of Directors instead of two would be an area in which some management
cost savings may be realized. Another probable area targeted for management cost
reductions likely would be post-slaughter cold storage and transportation.
After a merger, the merged firm’s new cost structure of the j across product
market firms is provided in expression 6.2.
j

j

i 1

i 1

C   ki    mi

(6.2)

The  parameter is a scalar that measures the realized management cost changes after a
multiproduct merger. The cost savings parameter  can take on values between

0    .

Sexton and Zhang (2001) state, “For example, although pork, beef, and poultry may substitute for one
another in consumers’ budgets, they do not substitute at all as inputs into a particular processing plant.”

7
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Next, the relationship between  and economies of scope are addressed. For this
analysis, Baumol, Panzar, and Willig’s (1982) measure for economies of scope (S). The
adapted equation 6.2 with adapted notation is

S

 (q1 , 0, 0)   (0, q3 , 0)   (0, 0, q5 )   (q1 , q3 , q5 )
,
 (q1 , q3 , q5 )

(6.3)

where  (qi ) represents the cost as a function of the relevant differentiated product
quantities. The presence of economies of scope occurs when it is less expensive to
produce all three products than it would be to produce each one separately. This would
result in the numerator being positive, along with the denominator.
In regards to one firm merging across the three submarkets as in Case II,
substitution of 6.1 and 6.2 into 6.3 the derivation of post-merger economies of scope
presented in 6.4.

S

3(k  m)(q1  q3  q5 )  3(k   m)(q1  q3  q5 )
3(k   m)(q1  q3  q5 )

(6.4)

As such, when S  0 there are economies of scope, S  0 indicates that diseconomies of
scope, and when S  0 there are no scope economies. As can be seen, when 0    1 ,
there are economies of scope and diseconomies when   1 . When   1 there are no
economies of scope.
Next, the exercise presented in Chapter V, Case I was repeated utilizing the
redefined cost function in expression 6.2. Each firm’s objective is to maximize profit
given their actions and those of their competitors. From this, the optimal prices charged
by all firms and the resulting output quantities were obtained. The optimal prices and
quantities for each firm are provided in expression 6.5.
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*
1,...,6

p

*
1,...,6

q



  1  2    1     k 1  2  4 2     m 1  2  4 2   
2  4 2    2   2
(6.5)

  k  m   1  2  4 2   

1  4     4 2  2   2   1    

Expression 6.6 provides the premerger profits.

 k  m    1    8 3  1   
2



*
1,...,6



2

 4 2  2   

1  4     2  4 2    2  





2 2

(6.6)

Now, reiterating Case II with the expanded cost function (6.2), results in
equations 6.7 and 6.8 which illustrates the new resulting equilibrium prices and
quantities.

pn*1,3,5

   1     12 2  2  2     1    2    

  k  24 3  1    2     2  4  5  

  m 8 3 1  2   1     2   4 2  1         2 1  2  3 1     

24 3  12 2  1      2   1    2     2  6   4    

pn* 2,4,6 












   1  2    1    2  6   



  k 1  2   6  1  2   1    2    



  m 1  2   2  2     4 2  2     1    2     



24 3  12 2  1      2   1    2     2  6   4    

(6.7)
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 1   1  4     24

3

 12

2

 1      2   1    2     2  6   4     



(6.8)
The required cost savings  * needed for a welfare neutral merger can now be derived.
Derivation is accomplished by setting pn*1,3,5 (the multiproduct firm price in Case II)
*
(the premerger case price) and solving for  * . The result is provided in 6.9.
equal to p1,...,6

 
*

Thus, when  
*

m  2  2     1  2  4 2     2  k      1   

2

(6.9)

m 1  2   4 2  2   2   1    

m  2  2     1  2  4 2     2  k      1   
m 1  2   4 2  2   2   1    

2

, then the

premerger price from Case I is ensured to be greater than the post-merger price in Case
II.
Comparative statics also provide insight into the properties of the required  * .
The partial derivative of  * with respect to across-submarket substitutability is

 *
0.


This shows that an increase in across-submarket substitutability lowers the required  *
value for the merger to be welfare neutral, meaning that a larger cost reduction is required
for welfare neutrality when across-submarket substitutability rises. The partial derivative
of  * with respect to within-submarket substitutability is greater than zero,
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 *
0.


This comparative static reveals that increasing substitutability within submarkets
increases the required  * , thus lowering the required cost reduction for welfare neutrality.
Together, these two substitutability parameters create an interesting relationship,
whereby as they approach one another in magnitude, increasingly higher cost reductions
are required for welfare neutrality, as visualized in Figure 6.1. From Figure 6.1 it is seen
that as within submarket and across submarket substitutability tend toward values close to
one another, more management cost reductions are necessary to offset any price increase.

Figure 6.1

Required Cost Reduction to Ensure No Welfare Loss

Note: For simplicity,   3 . The parameters m and k were also normalized to one each,
respectively.
This is especially important because the firms engaged in these markets are trying
to just that: differentiate their product from other direct competitors in the same subsector
and differentiating their products from other possible substitutes in the broader market.
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When the firm pursues product differentiation both within and across submarkets, it
allows them to increase the price-cost margin for each product in their portfolio of goods,
which improves firm profits.

 *
 0 , which
Other comparative statics yield informative results. For instance,

means that the higher the existing consumer maximum willingness-to-pay increases the
required cost reduction for welfare neutrality. This occurs because by doing so the firm
has effectively increased the price-cost margin, which increases the required cost
reduction for welfare neutrality. To counter this, greater cost reductions are required by
the firm (and passed on to the consumer via pricing) for welfare neutrality. Antitrust
agencies would be advised to look into to situations in which the price-cost margin
increases in this modeling framework. Also, the comparative static for both subsets of
costs results in

 *
 *
 0 or
 0 . Therefore, if either or both costs are initially high
m
k

requires lesser cost savings for a welfare neutral merger. Higher costs lower the pricecost margin for a firm’s product. The results indicate that with a lower price-cost margin,
it requires less scope economies for a welfare neutral merger. It follows that the antitrust
regulator might forgo analyzing situations in which the price-cost margin is lower in
favor of investigating situations in which the price-cost margins have increased.
In all, the expected post-merger economies of scope are an important
consideration in differentiated product merger analysis. Without sufficient cost savings, it
would not be possible to offset the increases in market power, and depending upon the
initial state of the industry, even greater cost savings may be required.
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CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSIONS AND GUIDANCE FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
The analysis is relevant and timely due to the prevalence of this merger pattern in
meat protein markets. The product differentiation model developed in this study is a
mathematically tractable and informative. Although this analysis focuses on the meatprotein industry as a guiding example, it is easily extended and adapted to other markets
in which mergers and acquisitions of a similar nature are occurring.
This thesis provides several contributions to the literature that are relevant to
academicians, antitrust regulators, and firm decision makers. The modeling framework
and findings presented contribute to a better understanding of the potential effects of
multi-product mergers, considers the required cost savings to offset market power,
identifies factors which inhibit adequate cost savings to be realized by the merger, and
has further characterized the role that within- and across-submarket substitutability play
in affecting the welfare neutrality of the merger.
The modeling approach also considers alternative market definitions and provides
several important findings. The primary finding of this thesis is that there appears to be
merit in the DOJ’s view that mergers within submarkets are more likely to cause harm
and must be thoroughly scrutinized. However, the results also indicate the importance of
recognizing that mergers across submarkets may also have considerable anticompetitive
effects as well; especially if sufficient economies of scope cannot be realized.
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Additionally, the results also indicate that firms should not blindly attempt to define the
relevant more broadly. This is because that even in a broader market definition,
significant anticompetitive harm may still occur, especially when the likelihood that
sufficient management cost reductions are small.
Finally, the results of the analysis also provide a plausible explanation for the
emergence of multiproduct firms and increased consolidation, especially as has been
observed in the meat processing sectors. The emergence of multiproduct firms and
increased consolidation is much in agreeance with Deneckere and Davidson (1985), who
demonstrated that in a Bertrand game with differentiated products, firms have an
incentive to merge. However, there may be non-market power driven motives firms have
for merging beyond strict profit maximization. Motivations for mergers and acquisitions
are not always transparent, and there often are several motivations for merger (Nguyen et
al., 2012). Given the demand relationships of the industry described in this thesis, it is left
for future research whether portfolio diversification may be a reason for these mergers in
the meat-protein sector. Additionally, this analysis ignores the fact that mergers are not
always profitable endeavors. In fact, Ravenscraft and Scherer (1989) find that average
profitability decreases after merger, with very few exceptions. The authors also suggest
‘control loss’ of the merged firm as a possible explanation for this.
Limitations and Extensions
The model developed in this thesis does not come without limitations.
Assumptions and simplifications are made as a necessary step for clarity of exposition.
As such, the major shortcoming of the current work is that the modeling framework has
not been fully generalized so as to be empirically testable in in a realistic market setting.
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Additionally, this model is specified using the Bowley function, limiting its application to
market settings which exhibit similar traits, making the Bowley specification suitable. If
the Bowley model does not accurately describe the market under consideration, a more
suitable functional form must be used. However, it is unknown if the model and results
presented in this thesis is robust to changes in functional form.
Assuming the broader market has a finite set of possible products as in the meat
protein industry, the generalized consumer utility was presented in expression 4.28. As
described in Chapter IV, several other generalizations are possible: allowing the
parameters  i and  i to vary for each product in the market, and allowing the number of
firms in each submarket to vary. To allow for a wider range of product competition,
another set of substitutability parameters may be added to account for each pairing of
products. For instance, it is likely the case that differentiation of products within
submarkets are asymmetric. In turn, every product, both within and across submarkets,
would have a unique substitutability parameter. This would result in a sizable matrix of
differentiation parameters. Additional extensions include allowing for costs to vary
across products being produced. This step would only improve the current modeling
framework if it is reasonable to assume the relative cost to maximum willingness-to-pay
differentials are significantly different.
Additionally, opportunities for extension of this model to include various strategic
concepts may present emerging research opportunities. For example, it is unknown how
8

For clarity, the fully generalized model is shown here:

n

1 n
U (q, Z )   i  qi    i qi2  2i , j  qi q j  2 h ,k  q h q k   Z .
2  i 1
i 1
i j
hk


For detailed parameter descriptions and relationships, see Chapter IV.
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the outcomes might change if exclusionary bundling or tie-in sales were incorporated as a
second phase strategy of the merged firm.
As an intermediate step for empirical analysis of an industry, or if relevant firm
data (costs) are not readily available, the modeling framework is well suited for use with
simulation methods. This type of testing has a distinct advantage for further
understanding the power and implications of the modeling framework. The advantage of
using simulation methods to test this model is that the relevant parameters can be easily
adjusted to “realistically relevant” levels, thus allowing for a wider set of predictions and
scenarios.
Finally, steps for future empirical estimation will be discussed. First, data on
market prices and quantities consumed are readily available (e.g. scanner data and USDA
reports). Once the data are acquired, econometric estimation of the relevant consumer
demand parameters is possible by utilizing the system of linear inverse demands shown
in 4.4. From this system, direct estimates of  i ,  i , , and  h ,k can be obtained. In turn,
realistic estimates for the required cost reductions for welfare neutrality can be either
simulated by obtaining estimated for production specific and management costs from the
firm and inserted into the generalized expression 6.9. The value of this simple approach is
that a rough measure of the required cost reductions for welfare neutrality can be
obtained as an initial merger screening or “quick-look” tool, utilizing a limited amount of
data and low time commitment.
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TWO PRODUCT BOWLEY MODEL CALCULATIONS
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This appendix illustrates the mathematics for the two product duopoly model with
the Bowley function, notably published by Dixit (1979) in the Bell Journal of Economics.
The Bowley function portrays the utility of a representative consumer for two goods
using a quadratic function, shown in (A.1).
1
U (q1 , q2 )  a1q1  a2 q2  (2 q1q2  1q12   2 q22 )  z
2

(A.1)

In (A.1), a is a reservation price, b is a slope parameter, and z is a representative good for
all other goods and has been normalized to 1.  is the substitutability parameter between
the two goods. At   0 , the goods are independent of each other. When 0    1 , the
goods are imperfect substitutes. At   1 , the goods are perfect substitutes. Next,
Equation (A.2) shows the inverse linear demand equations implied by the Bowley
function.

p1  a1   q2  q11
p2  a2   q1  q2  2

(A.2)

These can be solved for quantity to find the Bertrand-Bowley demands for each
quantity, as in (A.3).
q1 

 a2   p2   a1  p1   2
 2  1 2

 a   p1   a2  p2  1
q2  1
 2  1 2

(A.3)

Note that it is possible for a and b to vary across products, making them no longer
symmetric, but this is not done here.
Next, the quantities will be added together in order to find aggregate demand.
This is done because q1  q2  Q . After simplification, (A.4) will result.
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Q  (q1  q 2 ) 

 p1   p2  a2   1   p2 1  a1    2   p1 2
 2  1 2

(A.4)

The differentiated aggregate elasticity for q1 will now be calculated, which will also
work for q2 because the firms are assumed to be symmetric. The first step is to take the
partial derivative of q1 with respect to p1 , resulting in (A.5).

q1

 2 2
p1   1 2
Then,

(A.5)

q1
p1
can be multiplied by
, in order to find the
 a2   p2   a1  p1   2
p1
 2  1 2

differentiated elasticity for q1 , shown in equation (A.6).
Ed ,q1  

p1
p1 2
1
*

2
b 1     a2   p2   a1  p1   2  a2   p2   a1  p1   2
 2  1 2

(A.6)

For this comparison, the elasticity of composite aggregate demand will be calculated.
This requires making a composite price variable, p. This is done in (A.7). Note: Prices are
normalized such that p1  p2  1 . This can be done because the firms are symmetric.

p  .5( p1  p2 )

(A.7)

Given this, p  1 . With these changes, expression (A.4) can be rephrased as expression
(A.8).

a2   1   a1    2   p  2  1   2 
 2  1 2

(A.8)

Taking the first derivative of (A.8) with respect to p allows (A.9) to be obtained, which is
the composite partial derivative.
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Q 2  1   2

p
 2  1 2

(A.9)

From (A.9), the composite elasticity of demand for the composite aggregate demand can
be found, as in (A.10).

Ed ,c  

2  1   2
p
*
2
 p1   p2  a2   1   p2 1  a1    2   p1 2
  1 2
 2  1 2
(A.10)
p  2  1   2 

a2   1   a1    2   p  2  1   2 

Now, it is possible to check to see if composite aggregate demand is more inelastic than
for each individual aggregate demand. The elasticity of demand for q1 should be more
negative than elasticity of demand for the composite aggregate demand. From (A.6) and
(A.10), (A.11) can be obtained.

p  2  1   2 
p1 2

a2   1   a1    2   p  2  1   2   a2   p2   a1  p1   2

(A.11)

It is known that p , p1 and p2 are all equal to 1. Plugging these values in, (A.12) results.
2  1   2
2

2  a2   1   1  a1    2    2
   a2   1  a1   2

(A.12)

This is the required expression for which the Bowley function will need to satisfy in
order to be said to have the properties desired. It is found that for values of 1    1
and a  1 this condition is satisfied. Happily, this means that under the assumptions made
by this exercise, the full range of  possibilities from   1 (perfect complements) to

  1 (perfect substitutes) is possible so long as a  1 .
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Figure A.1

Comparison of Composite Own-price Elasticity of Demand and Own-price
Elasticity of Demand for Good 1
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Price Comparisons for Merger Cases
Comparison
PII ,1  PI ,1

Notes/explanation (if necessary)

PII ,2  PI ,2
PIII ,1  PI ,1
PIV ,1  PI ,1
PIV ,6  PI ,6

PV ,1  PI,1
PIII ,1  PII ,1
PIII ,2  PII ,2


PIV ,1  PII ,1


PIV ,2  PII ,2



See Figure B.1 and discussion.

See Figure B.2.
PIV ,2  PII ,2 when the condition

0    .75    1 is satisfied.
See Figure B.3 and discussion.

PIV ,3  PII ,3

PV ,1  PII,1
PV ,2  PII,2



See Figure B.4 and discussion.

PIV ,1  PIII ,1


PIV ,3  PIII ,3


See Figure B.5 and discussion.

PV ,1  PIII,1
PV ,1  PIV,1
PV ,3  PIV,3
PII ,1  PII ,2
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Table B.1 (continued)
Comparison


Notes/explanation (if necessary)
See Figure B6 and discussion.

PII,2  PIV ,3

PIV ,3  PIV ,1

Unless otherwise noted, these comparisons hold for the conditions 0    1 ,     1 ,
  0 , and 0  c   . Notation for this consists of the item being described in regular
script. Subscripts directly below allow for each case to be identified (I, II, III, IV, V), as
well as the firm/product to be identified (1..6). Refer back to Tables (5.1-5.5) for
additional information, if needed. In the context of the problem, firms 1 and 2 produce
beef, firms 3 and 4 produce pork, and firms 5 and 6 produce chicken.
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Figure B.1

Relative Price Comparison: P1 (Case IV) vs. P1 (Case II)

Note: To aid in graphing, α=1.5 and c=1. Areas in orange, which are above the horizontal
plane at 0, detail the areas in which the price for the submarket monopolist in Case IV is
greater than the price for the multiproduct firm in Case II. Conditions required for
PIV ,1  PII ,1 , as reported by Wolfram Mathematica are
 Root[4  12 2  11 3   4  3 5   6 


2
3
4
5
   8  16  54  24  10  4  #1


2
3
4
2
   48  20  8  16  4  #1

0    1, 0    
,   0, 0  c   .

2
3
3
   24  144  112  16  #1



2
4
   208  112  48  #1



   96  192  #15  192 #16 &, 2]
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Figure B.2

Relative Price Comparison: P2 (Case IV) vs. P2 (Case II)

Note: To aid in graphing, α=1.5 and c=1. Areas in orange, which are above the horizontal
plane at 0, detail the areas in which the price for the submarket monopolist in Case IV is
greater than the price for the multiproduct fringe firm in Case II. Two possible conditions
required for PIV ,2  PII ,2 , as reported by Wolfram Mathematica are:
2


 0    19 3  2 7 , 


0   ,

   0,



0  c 




(1)

or
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 2

 19 3  2 7    1,





 4  8 2  3 3  2 4   5   20  34 2  4 3  10 4  #1  



 
2
3
2



 .
0    Root   24  12  48  24  #1
(2)



 


   88  32 2  #13  48 #14  96 #15 &, 4
 

 


   0,



0  c 

This implies that for the restrictions 0    .75    1, then PIV ,2  PII ,2 .
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Figure B.3

Relative Price Comparison: P3 (Case IV) vs. P3 (Case II)

Note: To aid in graphing, α=1.5 and c=1. Areas in orange, which are above the horizontal
plane at 0, detail the areas in which the price for the Case IV fringe firm is greater than
the price for the multiproduct firm in Case II. The conditions required for PIV ,2  PII ,2 , as
reported by Wolfram Mathematica are
3  13    1,

 4  2  9 2  8 3   4   16  4  28 2  8 3  #1 
 ,
0     Root 

   4  16  16 2  #12   32  80  #13  48 #14 &,3  



  0,
0  c 
Within the realm of 0    .75    1, PIV ,3  PII ,3 so long as the substitutability
parameters are ‘sufficiently different.’
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Figure B.4

Relative Price Comparison: P1 (Case IV) vs. P1 (Case III)

Note: To aid in graphing, α=1.5 and c=1. Areas in orange, which are above the horizontal
plane at 0, detail the areas in which the price for the submarket monopolist in Case IV is
greater than the a price for a firm in the two multiproduct firm Case III. The condition
required for PIV ,1  PIII ,1 , as reported by Wolfram Mathematica is:
0  1


 2  3 2   4   4  8  8 2  4 3  #1



0    Root 
2
2
3
4

   20  16  8  #1  16 #1  16 #1 &,3  .



 0
0  c 
It suffices to say that under the restrictions 0    .75    1, PIV ,1  PIII ,1 when the within
and across submarket substitutability’s are ‘sufficiently different’.
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Figure B.5

Relative Price Comparison: P3 (Case IV) vs. P3 (Case III)

Note: To aid in graphing, α=1.5 and c=1. Areas in orange, which are above the horizontal
plane at 0, detail the areas in which the price for the submarket monopolist in Case IV is
greater than the a price for a firm in the two multiproduct firm (Case III). The condition
required for PIV ,3  PIII ,3 , as reported by Wolfram Mathematica is
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4
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Figure B.6

Relative Price Comparison: P2 (Case II) vs. P3 (Case IV)

Note: To aid in graphing, α=1.5 and c=1. Areas in orange, which are above the horizontal
plane at 0, show the areas in which the price for the fringe firm in Case II is greater than
the a price for a fringe firm in Case IV. The two possible conditions required for
PII ,2  PIV ,3 , as reported by Wolfram Mathematica are:
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As opposed to previous results, for the restriction 0    .75    1, PII ,2  PIV ,3 when
the substitutability parameters are sufficiently close. Or, conversely, the price for a Case
IV fringe firm is greater than the price for a Case II fringe firm only when the
substitutability parameters are sufficiently different from one another.
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QUANTITY COMPARISON TABLES FOR MERGER CASES
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Quantity Comparisons for Merger Cases
Comparison

qII ,1  qI ,1

Notes/explanation (if necessary)

qIII ,1  qI ,1
qIV ,1  qI ,1
qIV ,6  qI ,6
qV ,1  qI ,1
qIII ,1  qII ,1
qIII ,2  qII ,2



See Figure C.1 and discussion.

qIV ,1  qII ,1

qIV ,2  qII ,2

qIV ,3  qII ,3
qV ,1  qII ,1
qV ,2  qII ,2


qIV ,1  qIII ,1


See Figure C.2 and discussion.
qIV ,1  qIII ,1 under restrictions

0    .75    1.

qIV ,3  qIII ,3
qV ,1  qIII ,1
qV ,1  qIV ,1

qV ,3  qIV ,3
qII ,2  qI ,2
qII ,1  qII ,2



See Figure C.3 and discussion.

qII ,2  qIV ,3

qIV ,3  qIV ,1

Unless otherwise noted, these comparisons hold for the conditions 0    1 ,     1 ,
  0 , and 0  c   . Notation for this consists of the item being described in regular
script. Subscripts directly below allow for each case to be identified (I, II, III, IV, V), as
well as the firm/product to be identified (1..6). Refer back to Tables (5.1-5.5) for
additional information, if needed. In the context of the problem, firms 1 and 2 produce
beef, firms 3 and 4 produce pork, and firms 5 and 6 produce chicken.
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Figure C.1

Relative Quantity Comparison: : Q1 (Case IV) vs. Q1 (Case II)

Note: To aid in graphing, α=1.5 and c=1. Areas in orange, which are above the horizontal
plane at 0, detail the areas in which the quantity for product 1 of the submarket
monopolist in Case IV is less than the quantity for product 1 for the multiproduct firm in
Case II. The actual conditions required for qIV ,1  qII ,1 are laborious to present and detract
from the analysis. However, it is appropriate to state that given the additional restrictions,
0    .75    1, only when the substitutability parameters are sufficiently close will
the submarket monopolist produce a higher quantity of good 1 than a multiproduct firm.
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Figure C.2

Relative Quantity Comparison: : Q1 (Case IV) vs. Q1 (Case I)

Note: To aid in graphing, α=1.5 and c=1. Under the restrictions 0    .75    1, the
area in orange is never above the zero plane indicating that for product 1, a firm in the
two multiproduct case always produces more than the submarket monopolist. Without
these restrictions, the actual conditions in which qIV ,1  qIII ,1 are
1
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   .
 Root 
   20  40  8 2  #12   32  16  #13  16 #14 &, 2 






  0
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Figure C.3

Relative Quantity Comparison: : Q2 (Case II) vs. Q3 (Case IV))

Note: To aid in graphing, α=1.5 and c=1. Areas in orange, which are above the horizontal
plane at 0, detail the areas in which the quantity for Case II, product 2 (a fringe firm) is
greater than the fringe firm in Case IV. Given the restrictions, 0    .75    1, only
when the substitutability parameters are sufficiently close will the Case II fringe firm
produce a higher quantity than a submarket monopolist in Case IV. Without the
restrictions presented, the actual conditions in which qII ,2  qIV ,3 are
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CALCULATIONS BY CASE & WELFARE CALCULATIONS BY CASE
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Case I: Prices, Quantities, and Profits
Price

  1  2    1     c 1  2  4 2   
*
p

i  1,...,6
2  4 2    2   2

Quantity

  c   1  2  4 2   
* 
qi 1  4     4 2  2   2   1    
i 1,...,6

Profit

2
*   c     1  2     1  2  4    1   
i
2
1  4    2  4 2    2   2
2

i 1,...,6





Case II: Prices, Quantities, and Profits
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Case III: Prices, Quantities, and Profits
Price

pi*,c 

i 1,...,6

Quantity

c    2c  
2  2  

  c 1  2 

qi*,c   2  2   1  4   
i 1,...,6

Profit

Table D.4

3  c    1  2 1   
 i*,c  2  2   2 1  4  



i 1,...,6
2

Case IV: Prices, Quantities and Profits
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Case V: Prices, Quantities, and Profits
Price

pv*,i 

i 1,...,6

Quantity

c 
2

 c

qv*,i  2 1  4   
i 1,...,6

Profit

c  
 v*,i  4 1  4   
2

i 1,...,6

Case I Welfare Calculations
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Case II Welfare Calculations

Case III Welfare Calculations
Consumer Surplus

Producer Surplus

6c 1  2   3  c  2c   3   2 
2

z

2

 2  2    1  4   
2

6  c    1  2 1   
2

 2  2    1  4   
2

Total Surplus

3  c    1  2  3  2  2 
2

z

 2  2    1  4   
2
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2

Case IV Welfare Calculations
Consumer Surplus

Producer Surplus

6c 1  2   3  c  2c   3   2 
2

z

2

 2  2    1  4   
2

6  c    1  2 1   
2

 2  2    1  4   
2

Total Surplus

3  c    1  2  3  2  2 
2

z

 2  2    1  4   
2

Case V Welfare Calculations
Consumer Surplus

3c   
z
4 1  4   

Producer Surplus

3   c 
2 1  4   

Total Surplus

9 c  
z
4 1  4   

2

2

2
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2

SYMMETRY RELATIONSHIPS IN MERGER CASES
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Appendix E provides an explicit listing of the symmetry relationships exhibited
by the model. Table E.1 shows the relationships for all five cases presented. This
reference will aid readers looking at the comparisons.
Symmetry Relationships in Merger Cases: Prices, Quantities, and Profits
Case
Prices
Quantities
Profits
I
P1  P2  P3  P4  P5  P6 q1  q2  q3  q4  q5  q6 1   2   3   4   5   6
II
P1  P3  P5
q1  q3  q5
1   3   5
III
IV
V

P2  P4  P6

q2  q4  q6

2  4  6

P1  P2  P3  P4  P5  P6

q1  q2  q3  q4  q5  q6

1   2   3   4   5   6
1   2
3  4  5  6

P1  P2

q1  q2

P3  P4  P5  P6

q3  q4  q5  q6

P1  P2  P3  P4  P5  P6 q1  q2  q3  q4  q5  q6

105

1   2   3   4   5   6
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